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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
APPELLANTS' OPENING
BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
MAZHAR TABESH,

CaseNo.20040358-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction concerning Mazhar Tabesh
("Appellant") for Aggravated Arson, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-103. (Rec. at 3-5, 215, 220-226; Add. I; Add. II).
This Court obtains jurisdiction to hear this appeal of a criminal case involving a first
degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). This case was transferred from

the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4)
All of the issues raised herein were appropriately preserved through timely motions
at trial or through Appellant's Motion for New Trial.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

WHETHER SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED AT TRIAL
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S CONVICTION ON ONE COUNT OF
AGGRAVATED ARSON, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY?

In a jury trial, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given particular evidence. This court reverses a jury verdict only if, after
viewing all the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to that verdict,
it finds the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted." State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), citing State v.
Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991)(other citations omitted).
This issue was appropriately preserved in part through Appellant's motion to dismiss
at the close of the prosecution's case. (Vol. IV at 63).
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2.

WHETHER THE STATE ENGAGED IN PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT WHERE THE PROSECUTION URGED THE JURY
TO INFER GUILT THE FACT THAT THE DEFENSE DID NOT
ADMIT FINANCIAL RECORDS INTO EVIDENCE?

This Court will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial motion based on
prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Pritchett, 69 P.3d 1278
(Utah 2003); State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998). This standard is met where '"the
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its
absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant.'" Id. at 276.
This issue was appropriately preserved through timely objection and Appellant's
motion for new trial. (Vol. IV at 200-201; Rec. at 279-81; Add. III).

3.

WHETHER IT CONSTITUTED ERROR TO ADMIT AN
INCONCLUSIVE SCIENTIFIC COMPARISON BETWEEN PAINT
THINNER FOUND AT THE SCENE AND PAINT THINNER
PURCHASED FROM A STORE WHERE SAID COMPARISON
WAS IRRELEVANT AND OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE UNDER
RULES 403 AND 702 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.

"The admissibility of an item of evidence is a legal question." Jensen v. Intermountain
Power Agency, 977 P.2d 474 (Utah 1999). "However, the trial court has a great deal of
discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its ruling will not be
overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion." Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110
-3-

(Utah 2000); citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State v. Sutton, 101 P.2d
681,684 (Utah 1985).
This issue was preserved through Appellant's timely objection. (Vol. IV at 16-20).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are referred to in
Appellants' Brief and are reproduced at Addendum VI: Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-103,
§ 78-2a-3, § 78-2-2; Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; and Rules 403, 701,
and 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
An Information filed on or about September 19,2002, charged Appellant with

one count of Aggravated Arson, a first degree felony. (Rec. at 4-5; Add. VII, p. 1).
B.

Course of Proceedings
On April 23,2003, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the State,

at the preliminary hearing, failed to establish probable cause that Appellant committed the
crime charged. (Rec. at 68, 64). At trial, at the close of the prosecutions case in chief,
Appellant moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the State was unable to produce
-4-

sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. (Vol. IV at 63)1. Finally, after the jury
returned a guilty verdict, Appellant filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the State
had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. (Rec. at 260, 256; Add. III). This motion was
ultimately denied on June 25,2004. (Rec. at 369; Add. IV). A Notice of Appeal was timely
filed on June 30, 2004. (Rec. at 371-373; Add. V).
C.

Disposition in Trial Court
Appellant was found guilty of Aggravated Arson on February 12, 2004,

following a jury trial. (Vol. IV at 248). He was sentenced on April 29, 2004, to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and up to life in prison. (Sent. Tr. at 20).
However, the Court suspended the prison term and placed Appellant on probation. The
Court ordered the following conditions of probation: Appellant was to serve one year in the
Wasatch County Jail, where he was to be eligible for work release after 90 days; subsequent
to his release from jail, he was ordered to contact Adult Probation and Parole, who would

*The jury trial transcript in the instant case comprises five volumes. The volume
detailing proceedings on February 9, 2004, shall be referred to as Vol. I. The volume
detailing proceedings on the morning of February 10, 2004, shall be referred to as Vol.
IIA. A separate volume was created for this part of the proceedings because a court
reporter was not initially available. (Vol. II at 1). The volume detailing events of the
afternoon of February 10, 2003 shall be referred to as Vol. IIB. The two volumes
recording proceedings on February 11 and 12 shall be referred to as Volumes III and IV
respectively.
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supervise the remainder of his probation. (Sent. Tr. at 20). In addition, the Court further
ordered Appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $135,444.00 and a fine in the amount
of $1,000.00. (Sent. Tr. at 20). Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on June 30,2004.
(Rec. at 371-373; Add. V).
D.

Statement of Material Facts
Mr. Tabesh, (Appellant) moved to the United States from Pakistan in 1981 with

his wife Samina. (Vol. IV at 106). He attended and graduated from Skyline College and, at
the time of trial, had been working for Wells Fargo Bank for eight-and-a-half years. (Vol.
IV at 107). In addition to his career with Wells Fargo, Mr. Tabesh also owned and operated
the Alpine Lodge Motel (hereinafter "The Lodge"). (Vol. IV at 109). Despite gaining his
citizenship in 1993, he and his wife had been the brunt of several racially motivated threats;
people had spat on windows and several anonymous callers told them "to go back where they
came from." (Vol. Ill at 170; Vol. IV at 149). On July 21, 2002, The Lodge was allegedly
set on fire intentionally. (Vol. IIB at 184).
THE FIRE
At approximately 11:30 p.m. on July 21,2002, Burke Winget left his house to buy a
drink from a convenience store. (Vol. IIB at 7). While en route, he drove through a patch
of smoke near The Lodge and observed smoke coming out of the air conditioner on top of
-6-

the building. (Vol. IIB at 7, 8). Mr. Winget parked his car and found Mr. Tabesh near the
office. (Vol. IIB at 9). Mr. Winget informed him of his observations and Mr. Tabesh
purportedly remained calm and answered all of his questions. (Vol. IIB at 11). Mr. Tabesh
indicated that someone was staying in room 112, which was in the vicinity of the smoke.
(Vol. IIB at 12,131). Mr. Winget instructed Mr. Tabesh to call 9-1-1 while he checked the
room. (Vol. IIB at 12). On his way to room 112, he noticed that the stairwell to the top floor
was covered in black smoke and that flames were present at the top of the stairs. (Vol. IIB
at 13). As Mr. Winget knocked on room 112, he purportedly noticed Mr. Tabesh standing
behind him. (Vol. IIB at 15). Mr. Winget asked Mr. Tabesh to call 9-1-1. (Vol. IIB at 15).
However, Mr. Tabesh testified that he did not follow Mr. Winget to room 112 but, instead,
ran out to see how bad the fire was, and then immediately ran back into the office to call 9-1 1. (Vol. IV at 136-37).
As Mr. Winget knocked on room 112, he noticed three people walk across the parking
lot. (Vol. IIB at 16). A young woman, who was later determined to be Mr. Tabesh's wife,
was hysterical and screaming, "my husband, my husband." (Vol. IIB at 16). Mr. Winget
initially testified that "there was no doubt she was pointing to room 112 while she was
screaming;" however, he later testified that she was pointing in the direction of room 112,
and he could not say with any degree of certainty that that was where she intended to point.
-7-

(Vol. IIB at 33-34). In addition, the stairs which lead to Mr. Tabesh's apartment were only
10 feet away from room 112. (Vol. IIB at 34, 52).
While Mr. Winget continued to knock on the door to room 112, Mr. Tabesh's fatherin-law retrieved a fire extinguisher for him. (Vol. IIB at 21). At this point, Mr. Tabesh had
returned from the office and Mr. Winget instructed him to open room 112 and see if anyone
was in the room; meanwhile, he proceeded up the stairs to the fire. (Vol. IIB at 22). Upon
reaching the top of the stairs, he pointed the extinguisher at the flame and put out the fire.
(Vol. IIB at 23). At this point, the fire department had arrived and Mr. Winget deferred
further action to them and went to the ambulance where he received oxygen. (Vol. IIB at
24).
POLICE RESPONSE
Officer Allred was first police official to arrive at the scene and he initially began
directing traffic. (Vol. IIB at 72, 73). Deputy Graves arrived shortly thereafter and began
assessing the scene. (Vol. IIB at 109-110). Deputy Graves met Mr. Tabesh who informed
him that someone had checked into room 112. (Vol. IIB at 111). Deputy Graves began
pounding on the door and indicated that he was going to kick the door down. (Vol. IIB at
112). However, Mr. Tabesh said he could get a key for the officer. (Vol. IIB at 112.) Mr.
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Tabesh returned in a matter of seconds with the key; he unlocked the door and pushed it
open. (Vol. IIB at 113, 129).
Deputy Graves entered the room and briefly looked around to determine whether
anyone was in the room. (Vol. IIB at 115). He noticed a small fire but did not see anyone
in the room. (Vol. IIB at 115). He also noted that the fire alarm was not sounding. (Vol. IIB
at 115). After he exited the room, he realized that Sergeant Jeff Winterton had arrived from
the fire department. (Vol. IIB at 116). He advised Sergeant Winterton about of the fire and
subsequently went in with a fire-hose and put it out. (Vol. IIB at 117).
Deputy Graves waited by the door with Mr. Tabesh and asked him to get any
information on the individual who had checked into the room. (Vol. IIB at 118). Mr. Tabesh
informed him that he had no ID or credit card information but he pointed to a yellow receipt
that was located on the night stand and indicated that it was the individual's receipt. (Vol IIB
at 118). Deputy Graves could not immediately see the receipt, but he and Sergeant Winterton
approached the night stand and found the receipt folded up on the corner. (Vol. IIB at 120).
The officers attempted to open the receipt, placing one gloved finger on the corner and
flicking it open with a pen. (Vol. IIB at 145). Eventually they opened the receipt enough to
determine it was illegible. (Vol. IIB at 145). At that point, Sergeant Winterton realized there
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were pour spots and matches on the bed so he directed everyone to exit the room. (Vol. IIB
at 146).
Deputy Graves retrieved Officer Allred because he was jurisdictionally permitted to
investigate the case; meanwhile, Sergeant Winterton remained in the room. (Vol. IIB at 122,
147). Officer Allred secured the room with police-tape and photographed it. (Vol. IIB at 7677). The receipt on the night stand was visible in the photographs that were taken from the
doorway. (Vol. IIB at 77). Officer Allred then proceeded to the office with Mr. Tabesh
where he was given the original copy of the receipt and the four ten-dollar bills that the
individual used to pay for the room. (Vol. IIB at 79). He asked Mr. Tabesh to put both items
into evidence bags. (Vol. IIB at 81).
Both Sergeant Winterton and Deputy Graves testified that they never gathered any
evidence from room 112. (Vol. IIB at 121, 148). Officer Clegg, who arrived on the scene
close to midnight, testified that he and Officer Allred returned to room 112 sometime after
his arrival and collected the receipt that was located on the night stand. (Vol. Ill at 48). In
addition, he testified that he put on a new pair of gloves and collected a taco shell bag that
was located near the receipt and placed it in an evidence bag. (Vol. Ill at 49). However, this
testimony was contrary to that of Mr. Tabesh, who indicated that, in addition to the receipts
from the office, he was "certain" that Officer Graves had him go into the room and get the
-10-

receipt off the night stand. (Vol. IV at 134). The officers also located a one-gallon plastic
jug that appeared to have been used to pour gasoline in the upstairs hallway; it was collected
with gloves and bagged into evidence. (Vol. IIB at 83; Vol. Ill at 47). Officers also analyzed
the smoke detector and determined it was not working because the battery had slid back away
from the contact prongs; it was in the smoke detector, but it was not making the necessary
contact for it to be operational. (Vol. Ill at 56). The officers later discovered that the
batteries in the smoke detectors of rooms 109, 110 and 111 all failed to make contact with
the batteries in this manner. (Vol. Ill at 97-98).
Lane Clyde and Mark Luke arrived from the fire department and entered the upstairs
ofThe Lodge through room 117. (Vol. IIB at 151, 157). Mr. Clyde headed left down the
hall and forced his way into room 121 where he found the fire alarm knocked off the ceiling
and laying on the floor. (Vol. IIB at 152-53). Mr. Luke headed right down the hall and
disabled a fire alarm that was sounding in room 114. (Vol. IIB at 157-58).
THE INVESTIGATION
Jim Dudzinski arrived at close to 8:00 am on July 22, 2002 as the assigned arson
investigator for the case. (Vol. IIB at 160). First, he observed several pour patterns around
the hotel. (Vol. IIB at 165-167). He noticed pour patterns in the back closet of room 112;
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on the bed in room 112; and in front of several doors in the upstairs hall. (Vol. IIB at 165167).
Investigator Dudzinski testified that, in his expert opinion, an accelerant was poured
upstairs in front of several of the doors and then connected with a trailer. (Vol. IIB at 178).
The individual then stood at the top of the stairs and threw a match in both directions down
the hall and escaped down the stairs. (Vol. IIB at 178). However, despite the use of the
accelerant, the upstairs fire was eventually extinguished because it did not have enough
oxygen to sustain itself. (Vol. IIB at 174). If there had been more oxygen available to the
fire, it would have likely burned the entire building down, including the area where Mr.
Tabesh's wife and extended family were staying. (Vol. IIB at 174,190).
Investigator Dudzinski also testified that all of the pour spots, including those upstairs
and in room 112, could have been made from the container of gasoline that was recovered
from the upstairs hallway. (Vol. IIB at 175). Furthermore, he could not determine whether
the fire in room 112 was started before the fire upstairs, or if they were started at the same
time by two individuals. (Vol. IIB at 184, 191). Regardless, neither fire was burning for
more than 5-15 minutes. (Vol. IIB at 185).
Finally, Investigator Dudzinski was also advised that the arson was possibly a hate
crime. (Vol. IIB at 187). He did not find any indication that the arson was the result of a
-12-

hate crime; however, he conceded that, even in hate crimes, messages are not always left and
sometimes the arson itself is intended to be the message. (Vol. IIB at 187, 189).
THE GUESTS
Mr. Tabesh described the man who had checked into room 112 to police in an
interview conducted with the Heber City Police Department. (Vol. Ill at 60.) He was
described as a Caucasian, 30-year-old man, wearing a gray T-shirt and blue jeans with a
black backpack and dark shoulder-length hair. (Vol. Ill at 61). Mr. Tabesh indicated that
the man came into the room and filled out a registration form without any specific requests.
(Vol. Ill at 60). With Mr. Tabesh's help, the officers were able to make a composite drawing
to compare with people in their database; unfortunately, no matches were found. (Vol. Ill
at 62-63). In addition, the officers showed the sketch to Ms. Woolstenhume because she had
reported a suspicious male in her store asking questions about The Lodge on an earlier
occasion; unfortunately, she was unable to connect the two individuals. (Vol. IIB at 24).
In addition, the guest scribbled his name on the registration form such that it was
illegible. (Vol. Ill at 67). While records indicate that Mr. Tabesh takes information from
an ID when the receipt is illegible, this particular guest stated that he did not have any ID and
Mr. Tabesh did not think it unusual for guests to become "sloppy" with their writing because
they are often in a hurry or tired. (Vol. Ill at 63; Vol. IV at 127). Two more guests checked
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into the hotel approximately one hour later; however they made specific requests concerning
the room and so Mr. Tabesh placed them in room 106 to accommodate those needs. (Vol.
Ill at 79).
THE EVIDENCE
Sergeant Perry had an opportunity to interview Mr. Tabesh on one occasion. (Vol.
Ill at 231). In that interview, Mr. Tabesh purportedly indicated that he had gone down to the
basement to adjust the heat for the guests in room 106. (Vol. Ill at 232). Consequently,
Sergeant Perry investigated Mr. Tabesh's basement where he found two cans of paint
thinner: Clean Strip and EZ Paint Thinner. (Vol. Ill at 232). These two items were sent to
the crime lab and analyzed, but have subsequently been lost. (Vol. Ill at 253).
Jennifer McNair is a chemist for the state crime lab and analyzed several carpet
samples that were sent to her from The Lodge. (Vol. IV at 5, 6). Gasoline was detected on
several of the patches from the upstairs hallway. (Vol. IV at 11-13). The carpet from the
closet of room 112 showed signs of a petroleum distillate, which is a refined crude oil such
as paint thinner, charcoal lighter or dry cleaning solvent. (Vol. IV at 13). She compared the
chemical composition of the accelerant found on the carpet sample from room 112 with the
two jugs of pain thinner collected from Mr. Tabesh's basement. (Vol. IV at 15). The first
jug, which contained Clean Strip, did not match the accelerant used in room 112. (Vol. IV
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at 15). The second jug, which contained EZ Paint Thinner, did not contain enough contents
to run a comparison. Another can of EZ Paint Thinner was bought and compared with the
accelerant used in room 112. (Vol. IV at 16). However, the results were inconclusive, thus
she could not determine that the EZ Paint Thinner matched the accelerant used in room 112,
nor could she exclude it as a possibility. (Vol. IV at 23).
Elisa Macken is a fingerprint analyst for the State Crime Lab. (Vol. IV at 25). She
first explained several of the factors that may affect why some people do or do not leave
fingerprints. (Vol. IV at 31). She was given several items from The Lodge to analyze for
fingerprints. (Vol. IV at 32). She found a fingerprint on the telephone in room 112, but it
did not match Mr. Tabesh, any of his family, or any of the investigating officers. (Vol. IV
at 35). However, the print was not clear enough for her to send through the Automated
Fingerprint Identification System, so it remained unidentified. (Vol. IV at 37). There were
no prints found on the room key for room 112; on an opened soap wrapper that was found
in the garbage; on the battery from the smoke detector; on the pen used to sign the receipt;
on the ten dollar bills used to pay for the room; or on the plastic jug that was recovered from
the upstairs hallway. (Vol. IV at 38-44).
However, Ms. Macken testified that she was able to detect three fingerprints on the
back of the yellow receipt found in Room 112. (Vol. IV at 47). In addition, she found two
-15-

of Mr. Tabesh's fingerprints on the white receipt which was located in his office. (Vol. IV
at 50, 52). Mr. Tabesh would have handled both of these items in his regular course of
business. (Vol. IV at 126; Vol. IIB at 94). She also found three fingerprints that belonged
to Mr. Tabesh on the taco shell package that was sitting on the nightstand. (Vol. IV at 5556). However, Mr. Tabesh testified that he picked up the taco bag and moved it to retrieve
the receipt from the nightstand. (Vol. IV at 134). The fingerprints were consistent with
someone picking up the taco shell bag. (Vol. IV at 55-56). In addition to Mr. Tabesh's
fingerprints, Ms. Macken found an additional fingerprint that had insufficient ridge definition
to match it to anyone in particular. (Vol. IV at 55). Finally, she found one thumbprint of Mr.
Tabesh's on the doorknob to room 112. (Vol. IV at 56). However, this is consistent with the
fact that Mr. Tabesh opened the door for Deputy Graves. (Vol. IIB at 113).
Aside from this physical evidence, that was collected and analyzed, Mr. Tabesh's
clothing was never analyzed. (Vol. IIB at 96). His clothing was never analyzed despite the
fact that Investigator Dudzinski indicated that it was likely that the person who poured the
accelerant would have gotten some of it on their clothing or shoes. (Vol. IIB at 195).
Despite the fact that several officers testified they never smelled any gasoline on Mr. Tabesh,
it was still important to analyze his clothes. (Vol. IIB at 96; Vol. Ill at 144; Vol. IIB at 207).
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EYEWITNESS OBSERVATIONS
Steve Heaps and his daughter had driven down the road to observe the fire when they
noticed two individuals on top of a neighboring business roof. (Vol. IV at 74). They drove
toward the business and when the car pointed towards them, the two men jumped off the roof
into a white Camero-type car and drove away. (Vol. IV at 75). Mr. Heaps identified the
individuals as Caucasians between 18-25 years old. (Vol. IV at 77). However, at that time
Mr. Heaps didn't realize the fire was due to arson and, consequently, he didn't make a
detailed observation. (Vol. IV at 85). The next morning, Ms. Woolstenhulme confirmed that
her garbage can had been moved to allow someone access to the roof. (Vol. Ill at 16).
Officer Clegg testified that it is possible to go from building to building along the rooftops,
but there would be some long jumps required. (Vol. IIB at 117). The Heber City Police
Department conducted a search to find a white Camero that would possibly have young
drivers, but the search did not produce any results. (Vol. IIB at 122).
THE LODGE
Mr. Tabesh originally took out a loan for The Lodge in the amount of $460,000.00.
(Vol. Ill at 28). He paid a down payment of $108,000.00 and his monthly payments on the
loan were approximately $4,300.00. (Vol. Ill at 28, 32). Mr. Tabesh made every loan
payment up until the time of the fire. (Vol. Ill at 34).
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Mr. Tabesh had originally bought The Lodge so that his in-laws and their family could
run the business and keep themselves busy. (Vol. IV at 110). Unfortunately the family was
delayed in coming to the United States and Mr. Tabesh decided to put The Lodge up for sale.
(Vol. IV at 113). He wanted to start to focus on having his own family, and he did not want
his wife to have to worry about running the hotel while he was occupied with his other job.
(Vol. IV at 113). In November of 1999, he received an offer for $650,000.00 from Craig and
Jan Winter but just before the sale was finalized Craig was diagnosed with cancer and the
sale was not completed. (Vol. IV at 114-15). Mr. Tabesh took the property off the market
for a short while to see if Craig recovered; unfortunately he did not recover. (Vol. IV at
115).
Mr. Tabesh eventually put the property back on the market in August of 2000 with an
asking price of $679,000.00. (Vol. I at 165). Bijan Fakhrieh, the real estate agent for The
Lodge, felt the asking price was "a little bit high." (Vol. I at 165). However, it is not
uncommon to overvalue the property in hopes of making a profit. (Vol. I at 173). There was
never an offer made on The Lodge during that year, however, the company did have at least
four potential buyers. (Vol. I at 169, 174).
Sergeant Perry performed an analysis of all the receipts for 2001 and 2002 that the
police department had collected from Mr. Tabesh's office in order to determine how much
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money Mr. Tabesh was making on The Lodge. (Vol. Ill at 235). He found that for some
months Mr. Tabesh exceeded his monthly loan payments and for some months he did not.
(Vol. Ill at 239). While his profits may not have been the $70,000.00 he had estimated them
at, he still exceeded his payments and made a profit each of those years. (Vol. Ill at 240,
251). In addition, Mr. Tabesh testified that all of the receipts were not kept in the office
because his father-in-law takes care of the bookkeeping and some of the receipts were in his
apartment. (Vol. IV at 117).
INSURANCE
John Michael Sullivan was the Insurance Agent for The Lodge. Mr. Tabesh came to
him in June of 1999 looking for some competitive insurance quotes. (Vol. IIA at 13). He
found a fair rate through E.M.C. and Mr. Tabesh accepted the offer on July 15,1999. (Vol.
IIA at 14, 15). Every year Mr. Sullivan would send Mr. Tabesh a print out of a comparison
showing any changes from one year to the next. (Vol. IIA at 18). The print out included a
break down of the coverage for each building of The Lodge. (Vol. IIA at 19). For the first
two years, Mr. Tabesh's premiums stayed level, the third year it went up $90.00, and the
fourth year it went up another $128.00. (Vol. IIA at 21). Mr. Tabesh asked to discuss his
rates with Mr. Sullivan. (Vol. IIA at 20). In preparing for this discussion, Mr. Tabesh
noticed that two of the buildings' premiums had mistakenly been switched. (Vol. IIA at 22).
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The listed value of the South building pertained to the North building and vise versa. (Vol
IIA at 22). Mr. Sullivan agreed with his assessment and confirmed that the premiums had
been accidentally switched since the beginning. (Vol. IIA at 22). Switching the premiums
to their original design increased coverage on the North building by $70,000.00 and
decreased coverage on the South building by $56,000.00. (Vol. IIA at 30). This was to be
expected because the North building housed his residences, his office, and the better units.
(Vol. IIA at 40). In addition, while he was in the office, Mr. Tabesh also insured a canopy,
that had not previously been covered, for $10,000 and also discussed the need for separate
insurance on his personal belongings. (Vol. IIA at 24).
The canopy was damaged in October of 2001 when a moving company ran into it.
(Vol. IIA at 27). Mr. Tabesh filed a claim, E.M.C. agreed to pay the claim on the canopy;
however, they were eventually reimbursed by the mover's insurance. (Vol. IIA at 28). In
reality, the canopy was not covered by Mr. Tabesh's insurance because it was a separate
structure and needed to be insured on its own to guarantee coverage. (Vol. IIA at 30).
Therefore, Mr. Tabesh paid an extra $89.00 to insure the canopy for $10,000.00.
Mr. Tabesh also insured his personal items for $31,600.00. (Vol. IIA at 26). He paid
an additional $148.00 a year to insure his personal belongings. (Vol. IIA at 26). While his
personal items were not previously covered, it is not uncommon for people to believe that
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personal items located at their business are covered by their commercial insurance. It is not
until they learn otherwise that they realize there is a need for personal insurance. (Vol. IIA
at 34). Mr. Tabesh brought up the question about whether his personal property was covered,
but it was Mr. Sullivan who persuaded him to purchase the insurance. (Vol. IIA at 35). Mr.
Sullivan testified that there was nothing unusual about Mr. Tabesh's behavior or requests
during this meeting. (Vol. IIA at 43).
The damage prevented Mr. Tabesh from doing business at the hotel, and consequently,
the bank reacquired the Lodge in an auction. (Vol. IV at 113).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In the instant case, the State presented several pieces of evidence indicating that the
fire at issue was the result of arson. However, the State presented insufficient evidence
indicating that Appellant started the fire. The placing of Mr. Tabesh's fingerprints was to
be expected as he owned and worked at The Lodge. His wife's hysterical conduct was not
indicative of guilt but rather indicated that Appellant did not start the fire. Finally, much
evidence was presented indicating that the fire was, in fact, started by someone else. This
evidence included eyewitness observations noting that someone fled the scene by rooftop.
During the course of trial, the State was improperly allowed to present expert
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testimony regarding a comparison of paint thinner purchased from a store and an accelerant
used in the fire. There was not enough paint thinner left in a can found at The Lodge to
perform an analysis. Consequently, investigators purchased another can of the same brand
and performed the testing on it. Where scientific principles were inappropriately applied and
where the probative value of the analysis was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect, it should not have been admitted.
Finally, in closing the prosecution impermissibly implied that Appellant should have
presented evidence regarding receipts not found by police. This comment impermissibly
shifted the burden of proof to the defense and so constituted prosecutorial misconduct such
that Appellant's motion for a new trial should have been granted.

ARGUMENT
I.

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED AT TRIAL TO
SUSTAIN THE JURY'S CONVICTION ON ONE COUNT OF
AGGRAVATED ARSON, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY

I.

Standard of Review

"When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of arrest of judgment, [this
court] review[s] the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. We will sustain the trial court's
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decision unless the jury verdict is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an
element of the crime that all reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt." State v.
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

//.

Marshaling of Evidence

An Appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction
"must marshal all of the evidence in support of the [verdict] and then demonstrate that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
[verdict] against an attack." State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252 (Utah App. 2000) (quotations
and citation omitted). The following facts are marshaled for the State, in support of the
verdict, as required by law. State v. Pritchett, 69 P.3d 1278, 1284 (Utah 2003):
1.

Mr. Winget testified that Mr. Tabesh remained calm when he indicated the hotel was
on fire; he did not immediately call 9-1-1 but instead followed him to room 112.
(Vol. IIB at 11,12).

2.

Mr. Tabesh's wife was heard screaming "My husband," as she pointed in the direction
of room 112. (Vol. IIB at 16).

3.

The fire alarm in room 112 was not working, nor were the fire alarms in 109,110, or
111. (Vol. IIB at 115; Vol. Ill at 97-98). The fire alarm in room 121 was broken on
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thefloor.(Vol. IIB at 152-153).
The individual who checked into room 112 did not have any ID and the receipt was
too illegible to determine a name or address. (Vol. IIB at 118, 145).
Deputy Graves and Sergeant Winterton testified that they did not collect any evidence
from room 112. (Vol. IIB at 121, 148). In addition, Officer Clegg testified that he
collected the receipt from the nightstand in room 112. (Vol. Ill at 48).
Sergeant Perry found two cans of paint thinner in Mr. Tabesh's basement. (Vol. Ill
at 232).
Mr. Tabesh's fingerprints were found on the door to room 112; the receipt for the
individual who stayed in room 112; and on the taco bag found on the nightstand in
room 112. (Vol. IV at 47, 55, 56).
Mr. Tabesh increased the insurance coverage on the North building of The Lodge
weeks before it was set on fire. (Vol. IIA at 30).
When The Lodge was on the market, Mr. Tabesh did not receive any offers to buy it.
(Vol.1169).
While Mr. Tabesh was able to meet his loan payments on the hotel every year, it was
only marginally profitable. (Vol. Ill at 240, 251).
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C.

Reasonable minds would have reasonable doubt as to Appellant's guilt.

Where an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a jury verdict,
persuasive authority is found in the jurisprudence regarding a district court's arrest of
judgment. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). To make the necessary showing
to justify an arrest ofjudgment, a defendant must show either "the facts proved or admitted
do not constitute a public offense," or "there is other good cause." Utah R. Crim.P. 23. A
Court may arrest judgment because the facts proved do not constitute a public offense when,
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the facts are "so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element." Workman, 852 P.2d at 984.
Here, while much evidence was adduced suggesting that the fire was the result of
arson, there was relatively little evidence indicating that Appellant committed the crime. A
jury could readily infer that the fire was caused by arson due to the presence of accelerants,
pour spots, and matches. However, alone such does not give rise to the reasonable inference
that Appellant committed the arson. To link Appellant to the arson, the State presented
evidence that he owned the motel, that he was at the Motel when the fire started, that his
fingerprints were on a bag of tacos in room 112, that his fingerprints were on the guest
receipt for room 112, that his wife hysterically indicated that Defendant was near the fire, and
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that the motel was insured. This evidence does not support a finding, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Appellant committed the crime in question.
It is entirely unsurprising that Appellant was at the Motel when the fire occurred, he
worked there and was appropriately in the office. Appellant's fingerprints were on the guest
receipt because, as manager, he handled the receipts. No inference relative to guilt may be
reasonably drawn from these facts as they are to be expected, are completely consistent with
innocence, and are innocuous in nature.
Similarly, it is unsurprising that the motel was insured, in fact it would have been
quite imprudent to neglect to insure the property. While the State may argue that it is telling
that Appellant increased the insurance coverage on the north building shortly before the fire,
this fact must be placed in context. Mr. Sullivan testified that there was nothing unusual
about Mr. Tabesh's behavior or requests during the meeting regarding insurance premiums.
(Vol. IIA at 43). Moreover, there was a mistake as to valuation of the buildings that was
corrected. This correction caused a distinct change in valuation and consequent coverage.
While some of the smoke detectors in nearby rooms were not functioning, the smoke detector
in room 114 was functioning. Therefore, one cannot reasonably infer that the batteries were
out of contact intentionally. Likewise, no inference of guilt should be taken from the fact
that paint thinner was found in Appellant's basement where it could not be matched to the
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accelerant used in the fire.
Defendant's fingerprints were on a bag of tacos in room 112. This indicates that
Defendant had been in the room earlier, but again he owned the motel. There was conflicting
testimony as to how these prints were left. Appellant is cognizant of the fact that, in this
context, such conflicts must be resolved in the prosecution's favor. Nonetheless, if the jury
were to conclude that Mr. Tabesh left his prints on the bag before the fire began, guilt may
not be reasonably inferred therefrom. Where Mr. Tabesh owned The Lodge, his prints
should be expected to be found. As a part of employment, he often came into contact with
the belongings of his guests.
When Appellant's wife saw the fire, she was overcome with fear for her husband's
safety. She was crying hysterically. When asked where her husband was, she pointed in the
general direction of room 112. However, this was also the general direction of the fire and
of the office. Appellant's wife could have been indicating that her husband was in the office
or, more likely given her hysterics, trapped in the fire. None of this evidence directly links
Defendant to the arson. Furthermore, when put in context, it is indicative of innocence.
Even when viewed as a whole, this evidence fails to establish that Appellant committed the
crime.
In contrast, there is considerable evidence indicating that Defendant did not start the
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fire. Granted, this Court must view all evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdicl
and must draw reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the prosecution.
Nonetheless, in order to determine what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the
evidence, the evidence must be viewed in context. While the evidence must be viewed in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, all evidence should be considered and none should
be ignored.
Appellant gave the police the receipt filled out by the occupant of room 112. He gave
police the money with which the occupant had paid. When he learned of the fire he
appropriately called 911 to request assistance. While the State appears to imply that
Appellant's wife knew he was in room 112 and perhaps, therefore, knew he was going to
burn the motel. This is inconsistent with Mrs. Tabesh's hysterical conduct. Consequently,
such an inference may not be reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial. The fact thai
Mrs. Tabesh so seriously feared for her husband's safety indicates that he did not start the
fire. Finally, Mr. Tabesh's family was in the motel's office only two doors down from room
112. It would be incongruous for Mr. Tabesh to start a fire so near his family. Finally,
individuals were seen fleeing the scene by rooftop shortly after the fire began.
Cases where Utah courts have examined the sufficiency of the evidence after an arson
conviction are instructive. In State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah App. 1991), this Court also
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considered a case "close on the issue[] of whether... [the defendant] was the perpetrator of
the arson." Id at 333. There, the Court upheld the defendant's conviction for burning his exgirlfriend's apartment. In Span there was far more evidence linking the defendant to the
arson, yet the Court of Appeals still reasoned that the question on identity was a close one.
In Span, the defendant was upset that the victim broke up with him nine days before the
arson; after the break up but before the arson, the defendant twice vandalized the victim's
car; the defendant broke into the victim's father's house during this period; the defendant
visited the victim at work several times on the evening before the arson and the victim was
frightened by these visits; the defendant admitted that he was upset with the victim just hours
before the fire; and the defendant admitted driving to the victim's apartment near the time
of the fire. Notwithstanding the great amount of evidence against the defendant, the court
still stated that it was a close case. In the instant case, there is far less evidence indicating
that Defendant lit the fire at The Lodge. Therefore, it stands to reason that since Span was
a borderline case, the instant case falls short and there is insufficient evidence linking
Defendant to the crime.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHERE THE STATE
ENGAGED IN PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENT.

Appellate courts review "rulings on motions for a mistrial based on prosecutorial
misconduct for abuse of discretion." State v. Jimenez, 2001 UT App 68 at^[ 6,21 P.3d 1142.
The standard is met only if the error is "substantial and prejudicial." State v. Harmon, 956
P.2d 252,276 (Utah 1998).
The trial court's denial of a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct may be
reversed when "[t]he error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the
defendant.55 State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, <{ 10; 69 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Utah 2003). A
prosecutor's remarks will be deemed improper and will constitute prosecutorial misconduct
if the remarks "called to the juror's attention matters which they would not be justified in
considering in reaching a verdict." State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781,785 (Utah 1992); quoting
State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983).
A,

The prosecution's assertion during closing argument impermissibly
implied that Appellant had a burden to present evidence, and,
therefore, constituted prosecutorial misconduct

Again, statements constitute prosecutorial misconduct if they "called to the juror's
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attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict."
State v. Ernmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992). In the instant case the prosecutor argued
as follows during closing argument:
Even on the other examples that we had that officers went through, every
single receipt the prior year-and-a-half, all the receipts they had in the office
- and, by the way, Mr. Tabesh said they didn't get all the receipts. This is
what we have here. I haven't seen any others brought in.
(Vol. IV at 201). The prosecutor implied that the jury should not only consider but
actively infer guilt from the fact that Appellant did not introduce documentary evidence
supporting his defense. This inappropriately and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof
to the defense. The jury was effectively told that the Appellant (1) should have introduced
receipts into evidence and (2) that guilt may be inferred, at least in part, from his failure to
do so. However, Utah law places no burden on the defendant to present any evidence in his
defense. State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43,46 (Utah 1984). This burden never leaves the State.
Even if a defendant decides to present no evidence, or even no case at all, the jury may not
infer guilt from such a decision. Any inference of guilt shifts the burden to the defense to
present evidence to avoid this unconstitutional inference. The Utah Supreme Court has
indicated that, in Utah, the burden should never shift from the State. See Id. Therefore, the
shifting burden caused by the State's misplaced argument was constitutionally impermissible.

-31-

Furthermore, in this case, the prosecution called the jurors' attention to the fact that
Appellant did not enter certain receipts into evidence. Contrary to the State's implication,
the jury was not justified in considering this in reaching a verdict. Therefore, the State
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct.

B.

The prosecutorial misconduct in the instant case was not harmless;
thereforey the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion
for a new trial

Prosecutorial misconduct is harmful, and a new trial is warranted, if the resulting error
" 'is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence,
there would have been a more favorable result.'" State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7 (Utah 2000);
quoting State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct.App.1998). However, in this
analysis, "[i]f the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence
or evidence susceptible to differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will
be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel." State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486
(Utah 1984). Therefore, "[i]f proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, [courts] will not presume
prejudice; if there is less compelling proof, [courts] will more closely scrutinize the
prosecutor's conduct." State v. Callihan, 55 P.3d 573 (Utah,2002). In this case, the proof
was not compelling, such that this court should scrutinize the prosecutor's statement very
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closely and a new trial is required.
In the instant case, there was significant evidence indicating that an arson had
occurred; however, there was little if any evidence indicating that Appellant was the person
who started the fire. As previously detailed, the State presented circumstantial evidence
indicating that Appellant was at The Lodge when the fire started; that his fingerprints were
found on a taco bag in room 112 and the guest receipt for room 112; that his wife hysterically
indicated in the direction of room 112 while screaming, "my husband;" and that Appellant
had recently increased his insurance on The Lodge. This evidence does not establish
"compelling proof that Appellant started the fire. Therefore, close scrutiny is required and
the prosecutorial misconduct cannot be considered harmless.
When this Court looks at the evidence presented at trial as a whole, which has been
detailed in full, the State's case had several distinct weaknesses. This is the kind of case that
the Utah Supreme Court envisioned when it explained that where a conviction is based on
"less compelling proof, [courts] will more closely scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct."
State v. Callihan, 55 P.3d 573 (Utah,2002). "If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible to differing interpretations, there is
a greater likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel.M
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,486 (Utah 1984). In this case, where it was at least a close case
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and the jurors deliberated several hours before reaching a decision, any burden shifting by
the prosecution likely factored into the conviction and was therefore harmful.

III.

THE COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED EXPERT TESTIMONY
REGARDING INCONCLUSIVE TESTING OF ACCELERANTS
FOUND AT THE LODGE.

Jennifer McNair, an employee with the Utah State Crime Lab was permitted to testify
that she performed tests on the two cans of accelerant found at The Lodge. One can was
excluded by the testing; it was not the accelerant used in the fire. The other can did not have
enough contents to test. Ms. McNair purchased another can of the same brand from a store
and performed the test on the store-bought can. This test was inconclusive. Nonetheless,
Ms. McNair was allowed to testify to the foregoing facts over Appellant's timely objection
on the basis of relevance, and Rules 403,701, and 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (Vol.
IV at 14-20).
Utah courts have long recognized and employed a three step analysis to determine
whether expert testimony is admissible. The court "must determine whether scientific
principles and techniques underlying expert's testimony are inherently reliable; court must
determine that scientific principles or techniques at issue have been properly applied to facts
of particular case by sufficiently qualified experts; and court must determine whether
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proffered scientific evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Rules of Evid., Rules
403,702." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996); see also State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d
518 (Utah App. 1998). Therefore, before the prosecution was entitled to offer the expert
testimony regarding accelerant comparison it was required to show that the testimony's
prejudicial effect does not substantially outweigh its probative value.

A.

The probative value of the subject expert testimony was substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect

Courts have long recognized the fact that juries tend to put an undeserved weight on
any evidence that is presented in a scientific light People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal.
1968); cited with approval by State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). In the context of
Utah Rule of Evidence 403, this can have a disturbing effect as prejudicial evidence becomes
even more harmful when presented in a scientific light.
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 states in pertinent part, "[ajlthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury

" In the context of the case at

hand, any expert testimony concerning accelerant comparison should have been excluded
because its minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudice to the
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defense.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines the term "probative evidence" as " testimony carrying
quality of proof and having fitness to induce conviction of truth, consisting of fact and reason
co-operating as co-ordinate factors." Nolan J., Nolan-Haley J., Black's Law Dictionary With
Pronunciations, West Publishing, 1990; see also Globe Indemnity Co. v. Daviess, 47 SW.2d
990,992 (Ky. 1932). In the instant case, a comparison was made between a store-bought can
of paint thinner and the accelerant used in the fire. Moreover, the results of this comparison
were inconclusive. It is irrelevant whether the accelerant used in the fire matched paint
thinner that an investigator purchased from a store. Moreover, insufficient evidence was
presented establishing that the store-bought paint thinner had the same chemical composition
as the thinner found at the Lodge. Consequently, the probative value of this evidence was
minimal, if present at all.
In contrast, the prejudicial effect of this testimony was considerable such that the
evidence should have been excluded. Courts have long recognized that evidence presented
in a scientific light carries an undeserved weight with juries. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33
(Cal. 1968); cited with approval by State v. Ramrnel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). Herein lies
the problem. Even though the expert testimony could not compare the accelerant found at
The Lodge with that used in thefire,there was a propensity for a jury to place undue weight
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on the testimony due to its scientific nature. Moreover, the State repeatedly noted that the
store-bought paint thinner was not excluded, the clear implication being that the accelerant
found at the lodge could have been used in the fire. This prejudiced the defense, served to
confuse the jury and should not have been permitted pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.
Moreover, this Court "must determine whether scientific principles and techniques
underlying expert's testimony are inherently reliable; court must determine that scientific
principles or techniques at issue have been properly applied to facts of particular case by
sufficiently qualified experts...." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996); see also State
v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1998). In this case, where there was insufficient
evidence indicating that the paint thinner found at the lodge and paint thinner bought from
a store had the same chemical composition, scientific principles were incorrectly applied and
the expert testimony should not have been admitted on this basis also.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse
his conviction.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above matter.

isH

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .1 J day of December, 2003

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this ^O

day of December,

2003, to:
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

^^g
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ADDENDUM I

DEREK P. PULLAN, #6633
Wasatch County Attorney
THOMAS L. LOW, #6601
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
805 West 100 South
HeberCity,UT 84032
Telephone: (435)654-2909
Fax:
(435)654-2947

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

INFORMATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
MAZHAR TABESH
90 North Main Street
Heber City, UT 84032
DOB: 05/27/1963,

Warrant
Judge DONALD J. EYRE, JR.

Defendant.
The undersigned THOMAS L. LOW, Deputy Wasatch County Attorney, under oath
states on information and belief that the defendant, in Wasatch County, State of Utah, committed
the following crime(s):
COUNT 1: AGGRAVATED ARSON, afirstdegree felony, 76-6-103, as follows: That Mazhar
Tabesh on or about July 21 • 2002, by means of fire or explosives, intentionally and unlawfully
damaged:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the offense was in the structure
or vehicle.

This information is based on evidence obtainedfromthe following witness(es):
Det Mike Clcgg, HCPD
Sgt. Jason Bradley, HCPD
Sgt. Jeff Winterton, WCSO
Deputy Mike Graves, WCSO
Officer Rick Allred, HCPD
Chief Edward Rhoades, HCPD
Chief Robert Morris, WCSFD
Steve Ivie, Utah State Fire Marshall
Jim Dudinski, Utah State Fire Marshall

Authorized 19 September 2002
for presentment/fid filing:

THOMAS L. LOW
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney

ADDENDUM II

4TH DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021500182 FS

MAZHAR TABESH,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DONALD J. EYRE
April 28, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
diannb
Prosecutor: LOW, THOMAS L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): YENGICH, RONALD J.
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 27, 1963
Audio
Tape Count: 1:35:40
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ARSON - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty

- Disposition: 02/12/2004 Guilty

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ARSON a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

Case No: 021500182
Date:
Apr 28, 2004

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ARSON a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE
Defendant may be given the privilege of work release after he has
served 90 days.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1850.00
$0.00
$850.00
$1850.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$1850.00
$0
$850.00
$1850.00
Plus Interest
The fine is to be paid in full by 04/28/2007.
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Restitution:
Amount: $56000.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: COMMUNITY FIRST NATIONAL BANK
Restitution:
Amount: $79434.00
Pay in behalf of: EMC
The amount of Adult Probation & Parole
Adult Probation & Parole

Case No: 021500182
Date:
Apr 28, 2004
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
Mr. Yengich is allowed 90 days to request a restitution hearing, if
the amounts are disputed.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 3 65 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report by May 9, 2004 by 5 p.m..
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1850.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine on or before April 28, 2007.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to make himself/herself available to Adult Probation &
Parole and the Court when requested to do so
Defendant is to advise Adult Probation & Parole and the Court of a
current address at all times whil^ on probation.

Dated t h i s

i1d a y

of

P&T. fiY£E~
ldt Court Judge
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RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Plaintiff,

:

vs.
Case No. 021500182
MAZHAR TABESH,
Defendant.

: JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE

Defendant, MAZHAR TABESH, by and through his counsel of record, RONALD J.
YENGICH, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and based upon
accompanying memorandum, hereby moves this Court to order a New Trial in the abovecaptioned case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this if)

day o f t W / 2004.
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion for New Trial, this
Thomas L. Low
Deputy County Attorney
805 West 100 South
Heber City, Utah 84032

day of

2004, to the following:

RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 021500182

MAZHARTABESH,

: JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE

Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, MAZHAR TABESH, by and through his counsel of record,
RONALD J. YENGICH, and submits this Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
New Trial.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
A trial was held in the instant case during the second week of February, 2004. At the
conclusion of trial proceedings, Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Arson. The following
facts were produced at trial.1 On July 21, 2002, a fire broke out at the Alpine Lodge Motel in

1

A trial transcript has not yet been prepared; however, as this honorable court presided over the trial
proceedings, the basic facts presented at trial will likely not be in dispute.

1

Heber, Utah.

Arson investigators concluded that the fire was the result of arson.

This

conclusion was based on burn patterns consistent with an act of arson and test results indicating
the presence of an ignitable liquid.
Defendant owned the Alpine Lodge Motel and was in the motel's office, along with his
family, when the fire broke out. Mr. Burke Winget noticed smoke as he drove by the motel. He
ran into the office and informed Mr. Tabesh that the motel was on fire. Upon learning of the
fire, Mr. Tabesh called 911. Mr. Winget then began trying to put out the fire. He was
approached by Mr. Tabesh's wife and mother-in-law, who were both crying hysterically. Mr.
Tabesh was not in the immediate vicinity. When asked where Mr. Tabesh was, Mrs. Tabesh,
still hysterical, pointed towards the fire and in the direction of room 112.
Firefighters arrived and extinguished the fire. The motel consists of two buildings, a
north building and a south building. The north building suffered considerable damage, mainly
on the upper levels. The south building was largely unaffected. During the subsequent arson
investigation, officers concentrated on room 112 in the north building. This room is two doors
down from the office where Mr. Tabesh and his family were located when the fire began. There
was some kind of fluid in room 112 going from the closet to the bed. This fluid may have been
an ignitable chemical of some sort. Mr. Tabesh informed the officers that a guest was staying in
room 112 that night.

Mr. Tabesh retrieved the receipt that the guest had filled out.

Unfortunately, the receipt was illegible and the occupant's identity could not be established. Mr.
Tabesh explained that the occupant had paid cash up-front and that he was, consequently, not
overly concerned with the occupant's identity since his bill was already paid in full. Mr. Tabesh

2

gave the officers the cash he received from the occupant and the motel receipt. Mr. Tabesh also
gave a detailed description of the occupant.
At the time of the fire, there was still an outstanding balance on the motel's mortgage and
Mr. Tabesh had a second job. The motel was insured. The foregoing facts were addressed by
both parties during closing arguments. However, in closing, counsel for the State improperly
urged the jury to consider inadmissable and unpresented material in deliberations.

More

specifically, counsel argued, over defense counsel's timely objection, that the jury should
consider the fact that Mr. Tabesh did not present documentation in support of his defense as an
indication of guilt. This motion is based primarily on this improper assertion.

ARGUMENT
I.

A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED IN THIS CASE WHERE THE
STATE ENGAGED IN PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENT.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 governs motions for new trial. The rule reads in
pertinent part as follows: "The court may . . . grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is
any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." Utah
R. Crim. P. 24. Utah courts have repeatedly recognized that prosecutorial misconduct during
trial proceedings may serve as a ground for ordering a new trial. See e.g. State v. Saunders, 992
P.2d 951 (Utah 1999); State v. Callahan, 55 P.3d 573 (Utah 2002). A prosecutor's remarks will
be deemed improper and will constitute prosecutorial misconduct if the remarks "called to the
juror's attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict."

3

State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992); quoting State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51
(Utah 1983). Improper remarks must be deemed harmful if the resulting error " 'is substantial
and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have
been a more favorable result.' " State v. Kohl,

999 P.2d 7 (Utah 2000); quoting State v.

Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct.App.1998); but see State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah
1987) (in case seeking new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct, "[A]n otherwise valid
conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole
record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").

State v.

Callahan, 55 P.3d 573, 593 (Utah 2002).

A.

The prosecution's assertion during closing argument impermissibly
implied that Defendant had a burden to present evidence and, therefore,
constituted prosecutorial misconduct

Again, statements constitute prosecutorial misconduct if they "called to the juror's
attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict." State v.
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992). The prosecutor argued that the jury should not only
consider but actively infer guilt from the fact that Defendant did not introduce documentary
evidence supporting his defense. This inappropriately and impermissibly shifted the burden of
proof to the defense. The jury was effectively told that the Defendant (1) should have introduced
documents into evidence and (2) that guilt may be inferred from his failure to do so. However,
Utah law places no burden on the defendant to present any evidence in his defense. State v.
Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984). The burden in this regard never leaves the State; even if

4

a defendant decides to present no evidence, or even no case at all, the jury may not infer guilt
from such a decision. Any inference of guilt shifts the burden to the defense to present evidence
to avoid this unconstitutional inference. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that, in Utah, the
burden should never shift from the State. See id. Therefore, the shifting burden caused by the
State's misplaced argument was constitutionally impermissible.
Furthermore, in this case, the prosecution called the jurors' attention to the fact that
Defendant did not enter certain documents into evidence. Contrary to the State's implication,
the jury was not justified in considering this in reaching a verdict. Therefore, the State engaged
in prosecutorial misconduct.

B.

The prosecutorial misconduct in the instant case was not harmless;
thereforey a new trial is warranted.

Prosecutorial misconduct is harmful, and a new trial is warranted, if the resulting error M
'is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there
would have been a more favorable result.'" State v. Kohl 999 P.2d 7 (Utah 2000); quoting State
v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct.App.1998). However, in this analysis, "[i]f the
conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible
to differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be improperly influenced
through remarks of counsel." State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). Therefore, "[i]f
proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, [courts] will not presume prejudice; if there is less
compelling proof, [courts] will more closely scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct."

5

State v.

Callihan, 55 P.3d 573 (Utah,2002). In this case, the proof was not compelling, such that this
court should scrutinize the prosecutor's statement very closely and a new trial is required.
In the instant case, there was significant evidence indicating that an arson had occurred;
however, there was relatively little evidence indicating that Defendant was the person who
started the fire. The State presented evidence that Defendant owned the motel, that he was at the
Motel when the fire started, that Defendant's fingerprints were on a bag of tacos in room 112,
that Defendant's fingerprints were on the guest receipt for room 112, that Defendant's wife
hysterically indicated that Defendant was near the fire, and that the motel was insured. This
evidence does not establish "compelling proof that Defendant started the fire. Therefore, close
scrutiny is required and the prosecutorial misconduct cannot be considered harmless.
It is entirely unsurprising that Defendant was at the Motel when the fire occurred, he
worked there and was appropriately in the office. Defendant's fingerprints were on the guest
receipt because, as manager, he handled the receipts. Similarly, it is unsurprising that the motel
was insured, in fact it would have been quite imprudent to neglect to insure the property.
Defendant's fingerprints were on a bag of tacos in room 112. This indicates that Defendant had
been in the room earlier, but again he owned the motel. It is not surprising that he was in the
room. When Defendant's wife saw the fire, she was overcome with fear for her husband's
safety. She was crying hysterically. When asked where her husband was, she pointed in the
general direction of room 112. However, this was also the general direction of the fire and of the
office. None of this evidence directly linked Defendant to the arson. Furthermore, when put in
context, none of this evidence is particularly compelling circumstantial evidence. Even when

6

viewed as a whole, this evidence fails to establish "compelling proof that Defendant committed
the crime.
In contrast, considerable evidence was presented indicating that Defendant did not start
the fire. He gave the police the receipt filled out by the occupant of room 112. He gave police
the money with which the occupant had paid.

When Defendant learned of the fire he

appropriately called 911 to request immediate assistance.

While the State implied that

Defendant's wife knew he was in room 112 and perhaps, therefore, knew he was going to burn
the motel. This is inconsistent with Mrs. Tabesh's hysterical conduct. The fact that Mrs. Tabesh
so seriously feared for her husband's safety indicates that he did not start the fire. Finally, Mr,
Tabesh's family was in the motel's office only two doors down from room 112. It would be
strange indeed for Mr. Tabesh to start a fire so near his family.
When this court looks at the evidence presented at trial as a whole, the State's case had
several distinct weaknesses. This is the kind of case that the Utah Supreme Court envisioned
when it explained that where a conviction is based on "less compelling proof, [courts] will more
closely scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct."

State v. Callihan, 55 P.3d 573 (Utah,2002). "If

the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence
susceptible to differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be improperly
influenced through remarks of counsel." State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). In this
case, there was conflicting evidence such that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury's
verdict was influenced by the prosecutorial misconduct at issue. Therefore, the error was
harmful and a new trial should be ordered as a result.

7

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to order a new trial
in the instant case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of

V^P.

2004.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant

MQ:

by

RIONALD J. YENGICH

8

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for New Trial, this
, 2004, to the following:
Thomas L. Low
Deputy County Attorney
805 West 100 South
Heber City, Utah 84032
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day of

RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD YENGICH
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 021500182
MAZHAR TABESH,
Defendant.

: JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE

Ronald J. Yengich being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

My name is Ronald Yengich. I am over 18 years of age and fully

competent to testify as a witness in a court of law. I have personal knowledge of the facts set
forth herein.
2.

I am counsel of record and represent Mazhar Tabesh in the above-

captioned case.
3.

I represented Mr. Tabesh at trial and was personally present during the

course of trial, which was held during the second week of February, 2004.
4.

I was personally present during the prosecution's closing argument in the

trial of the above-captioned case.

5.

During closing argument, the State argued that the jury should consider the

fact that Mr. Tabesh did not present documentation in support of his defense as an indication of
guilt.
6.

When the State made this argument, I personally objected in a timely

manner on the basis that the argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct and that a new trial
was, therefore, warranted.
7.

This objection was overruled and the motion for new trial was, at that

time, denied.

DATED this Jl

day of April, 2004.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this Q^
My Commission Expires:

day of April, 2004

/00Z/QS/E0 tag -U1UKO Aw
TUV8 i n AUD3W11TVS
OOtr 21S *HWQS OOfr 1SV3 S£I

wm*)aivis-onarwAJtfvio*
nHOVNNV

Notary Public Wand for said County and State
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Affidavit, this •%"/ day o f / \ n ^ t A f

, 2004, to the following:

Thomas L. Low
Deputy County Attorney
805 West 100 South
Heber City, Utah 84032
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ADDENDUM IV

4TH DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UT$fr

:

On

'; Pinznsypy

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENT - MOTION HEARING
ORDER
Case No: 021500182 FS

MAZHAR TABESH,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DONALD J. EYRE
June 4,2004.

PRESENT
Clerk: diannb
Prosecutor: LOW, THOMAS L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): Yengich, Ronald J.
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 27, 1963
Audio
Tape Count: 3:17:00
CHARGES
1.
AGGRAVATED ARSON - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/12/2004 Guilty
HEARING
This is the time set for oral argument on Defendant's Motion for a New Trial.
Mr. Yengich addressed the Court and argued on behalf of the defendant.
Response and argument by Mr. Low.
Brief Response by Mr. Yengich.
Both would submit.
In this matter, the Court after hearing argument and after reviewing the file, will deny the
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial.

Mr. Yengich filed a Certificate of Probable Cause in open court and argued on behalf of the
defendant.
Argued and responded to by Mr. Low, moving the Court to proceed at this time. Mr. Low
asked that the Court not issue the Certificate of Probable Cause.
Response by Mr. Yengich.
Both would submit.
In this matter, the Court will Deny the issuing of the Certificate of Probable Cause at this
time. Counsel may bring the matter up with the Court of Appeals.
Until a ruling is done by the Utah Court of Appeals, the defendant is to be detained. Mr.
Yengich may petition the Court for his release at a later date.

r1It is so ORDERED this £*J

day of

_, 2004.

6 **f&
D(WEE^HSRE
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minutes: Oral Argument - Motion Hearing; Order, postage prepaid, this ^5*^day of
, 2004, to:
Thomas L. Low
Deputy County Attorney
805 West 100 South
Heber City, Utah 84032
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENT- MOTION HEARING

vs,

Case NO: 021500182 FS

MAZHAR TABESH,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

DONALD J. EYRE
June 4, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
diannb
Prosecutor: 'LOW, THOMAS L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(a) : YENGICH, RONALD J.
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 27, 1963
Audio
Tape Count: 3:17:00
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ARSON - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/12/2004 Guilty
HEARING
This ia the time set for oral argument on Defendant's Motion for a
New Trial.
Mr. Yengich addressed the Court and argued on behalf of the
defendant.
Response and argued by Mr, Low,
Brief response by Mr. Yengich.
Both would submit.
In this matter, the Court after hearing argument and after
reviewing the file, will deny the Defendant's Motion for a New
Trial.
Mr. Yengich filed a Certificate of Probable Cause in open court
and argued on behalf of the defendant.
Argued and responded to by Mr. Low, moving the Court to proceed at
this time. Mr. Low asked that the Court not issue the Certificate
Page 1

Case No: 021500182
Date:
Jun 04, 2004

of Probable Cause.
Response by Mr. Yengich.
Both would'submit.
In this matter, the Court will deny the issuing of the Certificate
of Probable Cause at this time. Counsel may bring the matter up
with the Court of Appeals.
Until a ruling is done by the Utah Court of Appeals, the defendant
is to be detained. Mr. Yengich may petition the Court for his
release at a later date.

Page 2 (last)

ADDENDUM V
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RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 021500182
MAZHARTABESH,
Defendant.

JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE

Defendant/Appellant, Mazhar Tabesh, by and through his attorney of record, Ronald J.
Yengich, hereby gives notice of his intent to appeal several of this Honorable Court's rulings in
the above captioned case. The Defendant is the party taking the instant appeal. The appeal will
be taken from the Fourth District Court, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre presiding. The instant
appeal will be taken to the Utah Supreme Court, which has relegated the appeal to the Utah Court
of Appeals. The following issues and orders will be raised on appeal: Defendant will appeal this
Court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which was filed shortly after the preliminary
hearing in the instant case; Defendant will appeal his ultimate conviction for Aggravated Arson,
including but not limited to whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to substantiate the
jury's guilty verdict and other trial issues that may become apparent once the trial transcript is
prepared; and Defendant will appeal this Court's denial of his motion for new trial. Regarding a

related but distinct issue, Defendant will appeal this Court's denial of his Petition for Certificate
of Probable Cause.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _30day of June, 2004.
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant

2

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Appeal, this

day of June, 2004, to the following:

Thomas L. Low
Deputy County Attorney
805 West 100 South
Heber City, Utah 84032
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM VI

§§ 76-6-103. Aggravated arson
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he intentionally and
unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of thefirstdegree.
Laws 1973, c. 196, §§ 76-6-103; Laws 1986, c. 59, §§ 2.

§§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs
and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies,
except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the
executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and
the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or
charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption,
and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court
may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over
which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Laws 1986, c. 47, §§ 46; Laws 1987, c. 161, §§ 304; Laws 1988, c. 73, §§ 1; Laws 1988, c. 210,
§§ 141; Laws 1988, c. 248, §§ 8: Laws 1990. c. 80. S§ 5; Laws 1990. c. 224. SS 3; Laws 1991.
c. 268. SS 22; Laws 1992. c. 127. SS 12; Laws 1994. c. 13. SS 45; Laws 1995. c. 299. §S 47, eff.
May 1.1995; Laws 1996. c. 159. SS 19. eff. July 1.1996; Laws 1996. c. 198. §§ 49. eff. July 1.
1996; Laws 2001. c. 255. SS 20. eff. April 30.2001; Laws 2001, c. 302. S§ 2. eff. April 30.
2001.

§§ 78-2-2, Supreme Court jurisdiction
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a
court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to
issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in
aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over:

(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or this
state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah
Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital
felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or
capital felony;

(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does
not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving
a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those
cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Laws 1986, c. 47, §§ 41; Laws 1987, c. 161, §§ 303; Laws 1988, c. 248, §§ 5; Laws 1989, c. 67,
§§ 1: Laws 1992, c. 127. SS 11: Laws 1994, c. 191, SS 2: Laws 1995. c. 267, SS 5, eff. May 1,
1995: Laws 1995, c. 299, §S 46, eff. May 1,1995: Laws 1996, c. 159, §§ 18, eff. July 1,1996:
Laws 2001, c. 302, SS 1, eff. April 30,2001.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 23
RULE 23. ARREST OF JUDGMENT
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative may, or upon
motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a
public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of
judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defendant is charged
anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be just and proper under the circumstances.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 701
RULE 701. OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness1 testimony in the form of opinions or
inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantially the same as Rule 19, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971). Rule 56(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), contained similar language.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), was
substantially the same.

